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NIKLAS LUHMANN, Law as a Social System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 498
pp., ISBN 0–19–826238–8, £65.00.
Despite the availability of sometimes brilliant English translations of many texts by the
late German sociologist and legal theorist Niklas Luhmann, his influence on AngloAmerican theory continues to be minimal. In his version and elaboration of systems
theory, Luhmann describes the collision of societal systems in an endless struggle not
for coherence, but for interpenetration, co-existence and perturbation, operational
closure and cognitive openness, not for ‘exit, voice and loyalty’, but for reflexive
processes of irritation and co-evolution, not for regulatory competition versus
harmonization, but for evolution and autopoeitic self-reproduction. These are key words
that are central to Luhmann’s theoretical construction and on which Europeans may spend
years of intellectual probing, convening conferences of extraordinary magnitude and
exhausting intensity, where they show their grey faces sticking out of turtlenecks or tieless shirts while they drink black coffee; not much of this seems to be of great appeal to
the Anglo-American world.
Where can we look for reasons? Already the number of English language translations
that are available of Luhmann’s œuvre should refute possible comparisons to another case
of – at least in the beginning – scholarly disinterest in the English-speaking world in
the work of Carl Schmitt, whose wide-ranging work has only more recently really been
discovered in English. The comparison does not hold because Carl Schmitt eventually
found his way into the debates in the English-speaking world, his work has been translated
and he has become the target of symposia, conferences and major collections. Giorgio
Agamben’s persistent inquiry into the ‘state of exception’ signalled a renewed interest in
Schmitt’s work and influence on contemporary legal and political thinking, one that is
again increasingly dominated by a normative thrust and a seemingly inevitable
moralization of positions into either good or bad, friend or foe. Luhmann, in contrast, is

regularly seen as disinterested, even incompatible to such universalizing legal-political
discourse. Instead, his identification of society as consisting of communications that take
place among scattered systems of consciousness, his pernicious insistence on the selfreferentiality of systems of meaning and the ensuing, hard-to-swallow, dire consequence of
an exclusion of moral thinking from driving and determining learning processes seem to
situate Luhmann’s concepts on the outside of most contemporary political and legal
theory. A closer look at the admittedly overwhelming volume of Luhmann’s literary
production, however, reveals a different story, one that is again powerfully told by the
latest English translation of his Das Recht der Gesellschaft.
Luhmann’s work appeared in English translation considerably early, but was
accompanied by nothing as vivid a discussion of his work as there has been in
Germany. After the first English translation of his small book, Vertrauen (1979a), his
important books from the 1960s and 1970s found their way into the English-speaking world
at best indirectly, through their Spanish, Italian, or Japanese translations perhaps, but
not through the availability of English translations. This changed in 1985 with the
publication by Routledge of an English version of Luhmann’s Rechtssoziologie (A
Sociological Theory of Law), originally published in German in 1972. While translations
of his writings, in rapid succession, appeared in Spanish, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese,
and even Serbo-Croat, English translations remained scarce. Another considerably
isolated English translation of his Macht was published by Wiley in 1979. The subsequent
publication of his outstanding essays in (altogether) six volumes of Soziologische
Aufklärung and his four volumes of Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik startlingly failed to
arouse any English publisher’s interest, while these essays that are rightly considered to
contain the central gist of Luhmann’s thinking were greeted with sustained enthusiasm
in Italy and in Japan. The 1980s and 1990s, then, saw English translations of his related,

exquisite study, Liebe als Passion (1986), and of his magnus opus, Soziale Systeme (1995). Two
happy incidents of timely translation are those of Luhmann’s intriguing study,
Ökologische Kommunikation (1989), and of his formidable study of welfare politics and
the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat (1990),
while the 1988 major study that would inaugurate Luhmann’s individualized
explorations of singular social systems beginning with the economy, his Die Wirtschaft
der Gesellschaft (1988) is lost to the English language world. The same fate seemed to be
reserved for the ensuing studies in this programme, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1993),
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft (1995), culminating in the 1997 volume, Die Gesellschaft der
Gesellschaft, and the posthumously published volumes, Die Politik der Gesellschaft
(2000), and Die Religion der Gesellschaft (2000). Laudable exceptions are the early
availability of the English texts of Soziologie des Risikos (1993) and of Die Realität der
Massenmedien (2000).
It is against this background that in 2004 a brilliant English translation of Niklas
Luhmann’s major treatise on legal theory, Das Recht der Gesellschaft was (finally)
published, accompanied by a comprehensive introduction written by Richard Nobles and
David Schiff, both experts on jurisprudence in general and on Luhmann in particular.
The English edition of the complex and densely argued volume has been prepared by the
translator, Klaus Ziegert, Nobles and Schiff, Fatima Kastner and Rosamund Ziegert.
With 11 years since the publication of the book in German, Law as a Social System meets a
somewhat changed theoretical and political situation of thinking about law. While, in
1993 in Germany, Luhmann’s book was understood by many as the major counterproject to Habermas’s Facts and Norms (1996), the discussion that dominated German
discussions in the 1990s has since moved on. With Habermas’s extension of his theory of
discursive ethics to the rule of law and parliamentary democracy, to the welfare state and

private law theory, culminating in a farreaching concept of proceduralized law, Luhmann’s
book did indeed seem like a stern counter-proposal, negating the direct determination of
law by political or, even less, moral concerns, while affirming law’s ‘irritability’ to
conditions in its environment. In contrast to Habermas’s passionate belief in the capacity
of a fragmented, highly diversified civil society to create conditions of mutual
recognition and democratic deliberation, Luhmann’s work has regularly been received as
much more dispassionate, even a-passionate with regard to normative claims offered about
the miracles that law was meant to achieve in bringing about a just society. A striking
coup d’œil of these alternative approaches to law is given in Luhmann’s exquisite
review of Habermas’s treatise (see Luhmann 1998). In it, Luhmann famously suggests that
had Habermas regarded the place of law within society with a greater sense of irony, his
theory would not have spelled out so great a demand (and, indeed, hope) for an integrative
function of the law.
Today, Luhmann’s major treatise of legal theory is likely to unfold in the contemporary
climate of the separating-out of the legal and the political. The thesis of law’s autonomy as
a social system, its autopoietic reproduction in a conflict-ridden domain and in co-existence
to other social systems, such as politics, economy and religion, is likely to be even more
provocative in times of law’s besieging by the sword-clinging armies of anti-terrorism
warfare and hegemonic politics (see Koskenniemi, 2002; Paulus, 2004; Krisch, 2005).
And yet, the long overdue, posthumous publication – Luhmann died in 1998 – of the
English text gives clear testimony of Luhmann’s uncompromising sensitivity to the very
challenges that law is facing – then and today. Luhmann’s legal theory is a highly
sophisticated study of the conditions that must be present if any communicative meaning
is to survive from the battlefield of contemporary conflict into tomorrow’s search for
stability and memory. Law can fulfil this stabilizing function – despite, or should we say

because of its relative autonomy from the rule-production that is otherwise taking place
within the parameters of economic exchange or political discourse. Law’s reproduction of
meaning consists of capturing a specific, timely understanding of ‘legal’ as differentiated
from ‘illegal’, without, however, allowing a larger societal discourse to set, shape and
further define this meaning and distinction of legal/illegal – against the tides of
domestic and international conflict. Instead, law – through an ‘introversion’ of sorts –
develops rules and norms informed by yesterday’s definition and assignment of
legal/illegal, that will serve as guiding post and reminder when applied to conflict
situations tomorrow. In a paradoxical combination of vulnerability and sovereignty for
the decision over the concrete case, the law relies on rules that it has developed through
repeated application in previous cases and it is through this application today that
the law constantly refines and improves its sensitivity to each new and different
situation awaiting regulation.
As always, Luhmann’s language, here in a faithful English translation, is
straightforward and matter-of-fact in stating what – in his eyes – ought to be seen as the
basis for understanding contemporary societies. It is only against the background of this
understanding of the particular role of law, that its function can be grasped. Building on
his groundbreaking theory that understands society as the co-existence and complex
inter-action (‘co-evolution’) of different systems of societal production that he laid out in
his 1984 work, Soziale Systeme, Luhmann posits the law as one of society’s social
systems, that is, one of the building elements of Luhmann’s description of society as a
whole. Law, however, presents itself as a special case in the concert of social systems
constituting society. The reason for the difficulty of identifying law as a social system as
alongside those of the economy, art, religion or politics, is that law seemingly permeates
all layers, spheres or, ‘systems’ of society. Luhmann says that law as a social system

performs society, it does so ‘with each of its operations by reproducing communication
and delineating it against everything else. But it instantiates its own autopoiesis, the
autopoiesis of the legal system, by following the legal coding rather than any other coding
or even no coding at all’ (p. 467). In light of this description it is obvious that law’s
confinement to the logics of a system’s autopoietic reproduction arouses resistance.
Luhmann is certainly aware of this and he carefully traces the origins and, in his view,
at least partially misleading assumptions that support the traditional positioning of legal
thinking. As is true of his masterful, early treatise in the Sociology of Law (1972),
Luhmann’s Law as a Social System explores the very possibility of law. Rather than
engaging in searches for law’s essence or its otherwise eternal inner nature, Luhmann
is interested in the ways in which we can see law perform its particular function. In the
search for identifying the function of law it becomes clear that what is at stake is the
recognition of the boundaries of law. With a view to what is inside, we gain a view on
what is outside – seen from the inside, through the lenses only there available. Luhmann
distinguishes law’s performance from its function: while law’s performance must be seen,
first of all, in the resolution of disputes and, building on this, in the steering of human
behaviour, law nonetheless has no exclusive mandate to do so. With other mechanisms
available for resolving conflicts and for shaping human conduct, law cannot be defined
exclusively through its performance. It is instead through its function that we can begin
to understand the unique quality of law.
In Luhmann’s theory, law serves primarily to stabilize expectations. It does so by
producing rules that preserve the identification of something as ‘legal’ over time and that
therefore are available for an assessment at a later point in time. The time-binding quality of
law is thus the basis and the core of Luhmann’s legal theory and it is here that many
commentators miss an outspoken commitment to a normative framework, a certain

political or ethical model of social order. In Luhmann’s view, the law cannot offer such a
model, or programme. Instead, it ‘reacts’ to normative or other demands, irritations, from
outside its systematic frame of reference, by reacting to changes in its own mode. The
legal system does not react to the world outside, it reacts to challenges from inside
that result from the way in which the law deals with a new case. At first sight, this must
seem to stand at odds with the view that identifies the law as never having been
anything but a formidable weapon in the hands of the powerful in the first place.
When Luhmann insists that there is ‘no transfer of information from the environment
to the system’ (p. 468), this must rightly disturb those who wish to shape the legal
system on the basis of political demands and ethical programmes. Yet Luhmann makes
clear that the law is not blind to what is going on outside of it. Instead, ‘[t]he social
relevance of law is indisputable. However, its integrative function is very much in doubt.
This has been pointed out time and again by, above all, the critical legal studies
movement and by other critics inspired by Marx.’ ‘We can avoid’, Luhmann goes on, ‘this
controversy by moving the problem to the temporal dimension. We see the social meaning
of law in the fact that there are social consequences if expectations can be secured as stable
expectations over time’ (p. 143). Later, we read: ‘Abstractly, law deals with the social
costs of the time binding of expectations. Concretely, law deals with the function of the
stabilization of the normative expectations by regulating how they are generalized in
relation to their temporal, factual, and social dimensions’ (pp. 147–8).
In the middle chapters of the book, this inside/outside perspective is further laid out.
The ‘Evolution of Law’ (Chapter 6) is characterized by the emergence of an internal,
self-referential system of rules, legal doctrine (Rechtsdogmatik) and the increasing
supremacy of courts over the executive and, later, the parliament (Chapter 7), in speaking
out what the law is. This is exemplified by the emergence of the constitution as (in

Luhmann’s words) an ‘evolutionary achievement’ (Luhmann, 1989). A constitution puts
on paper that which has always been and will for the time to come be the virtual
consensus on what the law is. The courts are asked to interpret the constitution, aware
of the interpreted text embodying the law as it exists in its intricate relationship to the
system of politics to which it is structurally coupled through the constitution.
‘Writing’, Luhmann notes, ‘operates with the advantage that it keeps knowledge
readily available for unexpected, optional access’ (p. 234). This is further developed in the
eminently important

Chapter 10

that illuminates

the concept of

‘structural

couplings’. Besides the constitution, other examples of such ‘couplings’ include
contract and property. They occupy specific places within the emerging framework of legal
doctrine, and thus have an internal role in the evolution of the legal system while, externally,
they carry out a central function for the development of the economy. They operate inside of
each system but have an internally different performance in each.
While property as an economic term does have the value of ownership attached to it
while lacking the capacity of determining ownership, in the legal system, property reflects
the determination of ownership without attaching a more general value to it. This is
certainly a problematic demarcation, and Luhmann is well aware of its problems.
Earlier, he rejected the reductionist perspectives of the legal theory of the ‘economic
analysis of law’, aka ‘law and economics’, which he dismisses on the premise that its
protagonists too restrictively identify economic motives as the driving forces of the legal
system. In contrast, Luhmann underlines the quality of the legal system as able to carry
out its function in a highly differentiated, fragmented society, finding application in polycontextual domains that constantly expose the limits and boundaries of law. Law, then, readjusts its borders to these fast-changing, dynamic contexts by further refining its
instrumental apparatus.

We are reminded of the painful conversations between Chekhov’s (1985) Mrs
Ranyevskajya, the dramatically impoverished landlord of an old cherry orchard, and the
self-made entrepreneur, Lopahin, about breaking up the otherwise doomed estate into
separate entities for lease. While the former clearly hears the message that this move
would ‘save’ her, the business proposition remains entirely at odds with a worldview
in which the orchard reflects former, more fortunate times, captured by Chekhov’s
brilliant exposition of the drama of what Karl Polanyi (1944) has described as the
devastating effects of the emerging market society. The separate worlds that are reflected in
her respective utterances in this eventually futile conversation about saving the estate,
mark the challenge in the face of which the law constantly operates. One should not for a
minute underestimate Luhmann’s awareness of this world. In defence of the apparently
austere and consequentialist style in which he defines legal theory as being about the
boundaries of law, one might only point to the many parts in his work where he sincerely
questions the very possibility of law’s carrying out this function, described by him as no
less than the preservation of meaning over time, of the stabilization of expectations of
what the law is and what it is not.
The above-indicated tensions unfold fully in his concluding chapter, ‘Society and Its
Law’, where we find a gripping and chilling account of law in times of globalization. This
chapter is well worth distributing in advanced university courses on the prospects of the
rule of law in an era of dramatic denationalization, deterritorialized commerce, war and
transnational societal disintegration. In light of the increasingly questionable ability of
the nation-state to define the limits and framework for the economy, science and other
spheres of society, its ability to preserve a ‘national’ legal system is in danger as well.
By raising the question of how the law might at all be able to still function outside the
confines of the nation-state, with regard to internal, ethnic conflicts, the challenges of

multiparty, post-conflict, nation-building (Markovits, 2001; Gross, 2004), or, international
environmental (Ellis, 2006), security (Anderson, 2004) or legitimacy (Perez, 2003; Chander,
2005) concerns, Luhmann puts the finger on the wound of the increasingly ailing and
beaten body of law. His treatise lays out in excruciating detail the very fragility and
vulnerability of law. Indeed, Luhmann concedes the manifold conditions of
embeddedness of the fine-lined, multi-polar body of the legal system. In recognizing that
the law has been able to carry out its function over time, he admits that much of this is likely
to have been owed to the institutionalization of relatively stable political conditions. All
this is in danger today from many sides. Law’s increasing fragmentation due to a
constantly growing number of norm-producing entities, each with contestable claims to
identity, recognition and enforcement, as well as its growing competition with other
social systems akin to the law (Teubner, 1997; Calliess, 2002; Fischer-Lescano and
Teubner, 2004), creates nothing less than dramatic and, perhaps, apocalyptic challenges to
law.
Robert Kagan’s (2003) brutalizing indictment of Europe’s ‘paradise of law’ and
deliberation in contrast to the United States’ ‘jungle of danger and decision-taking’, could
very well exemplify Luhmann’s concluding skepsis that what he described as the legal
system might, after all, not have been much more than an ‘European anomaly, which
might well level off with the evolution of global society’ (p. 490). Without further
exploring the emergence of concepts such as transnational law (Jessup, 1956;
Zumbansen, 2002, 2006) or post-national constitutionalism (Tully, 1995), Luhmann’s
text, 11 years after its original publication, exhibits an extraordinary awareness of the
central challenges of law in the world society. Citing his eminent article of 1970 (!),
entitled ‘The World Society’, Luhmann argues that society, today, can only mean world
society, a decentred, deterritorialized sphere of human activity. It is against this

background, that not merely the role, but in fact the very possibility of law must be
reassessed. Just one striking piece of evidence of Luhmann’s acute awareness of law’s
crucial function in the transnationalization of human rights claims, is his laconic mention
of the Alvarez-Machain litigation, one that has, in the meantime, found a dramatic end in
the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision not to recognize the US American Alien Tort Statute
(of 1789) as a basis for suing for a human rights violation initiated by US officials on
foreign soil (In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 2004; Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 2004).
Law in the world society will be determined by its internal reaction to the challenges
brought about by the conflicts that Luhmann already in 1981 in Political Theory in the
Welfare State aptly identified as bearing the prime responsibility for the assignment of
actual rights and entitlements, that is the dynamic between inclusion and exclusion.
Identifying exclusion as the distinctive mechanism that determines whether or not
individuals will have access to legal decision-making is rendered more dramatic by the
amplificatory qualification whereby initial degrees of societal exclusion will likely
result in further exclusion. Being excluded from one social system (no passport) will
likely further the exclusion from other systems (marriage, housing, education, extended
social welfare). In turn, this might reinforce desperate action, deviance, crime, in short,
illegality. But, maybe legality might no longer mean a safe haven. Seemingly echoing
Foucault’s last chapter of the History of Sexuality (Part I), where he unfolds the concept
of bio politics and the naked body, and even, perhaps, Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer,
Luhmann writes, ‘There is nothing to lose in the highly integrated area of exclusion,
apart from control over one’s own body’ (p. 490; see also Neves, 2001).
That there is much to lose, is well documented by such a densely argued exposition of
law as a social system whose primary function is to provide for a form of societal
memory with which meanings of legality are made identifiable, to remind, to haunt, to

inspire us. The contemporary debates over the legality of humanitarian intervention
(Koskenniemi, 2002), over the permissibility of torture (Ignatieff, 2004; Taylor, 2005), of
pre-emptive warfare in the name of national security – all of them constitute dangerous
games with the state of exception, omnipresent in Schmitt’s metaphor. It has rightly
been remarked that the current crisis of international law is a crisis of law per se
(Koskenniemi, 2005; Anghie, 2005). Likewise, Luhmann’s observation that today’s society
is the world society, makes pertinent the question, ‘Which law for the world society?’
From a governance perspective, many problems of the world society can in many
ways be seen as amplifications or dramatizations of developments that began in the
disintegration of increasingly heterarchic national legal and political orders, hence the
emerging awareness of the need of a bordertranscending administrative law (Aman,
1997; Krisch et al., 2005). At the same time, while the emergence of new actors and new
forms of norm production render the application of our nation-state toolkit redundant
and the memory of international law’s normative utopia ever more existential
(Koselleck, 1979; Zumbansen 2001a, 2001b), our task, time and again, will be to reassess
the very boundaries of the law, fragile, vulnerable and invisible as they might seem today.
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